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Online Book Reviews
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE:
THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
1780-1940
BY NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2013. 568 pages,
$125.00 (cloth), $55.00 (paper)

Reviewed by Michael Ariens
In Against the Profit Motive, Nicholas R.
Parrillo expertly explains how and why state
and federal governments moved from paying
their employees and contractors fees to paying
them salaries. The book offers insights into the
history of government finance and administrative law, shifting dramatically in time (covering from 1780 to 1940), subject matter (from
criminal prosecution and naval bounties to
naturalization and land titles), and geography
(discussing how different states and regions, as
well as the federal government, reacted to the
uses and abuses of fees).
The book begins with a helpful 50-page
introductory summary and then is divided into
two parts, each of which discusses a type of
activity that generated fees for government
officers: facilitative payments and bounties. A
facilitative payment was made when a government officer performed a service that a person
desired, and it was ordinarily paid to the officer
by that person. For example, if a person who
homesteaded federal land wanted to receive
title to that land, then, for a fee, a government
employee could facilitate that for him. A bounty,
by contrast, was a payment, usually (though not
always) made by the government, for a service
resisted by a person. A bounty might be offered
by the government to create an incentive for
someone to apprehend a fugitive from justice,
or to prosecute a person criminally accused.
As Parrillo notes, the relationship between the
fee-taker and one desiring a service, and the
relationship between the fee-taker and one
resisting the service, were qualitatively different, giving rise to different complaints about
abuses of the fee system.
Salaries replaced fees for facilitative services in a two-stage process. The first stage
took place largely in the early 19th century,
and Parrillo makes a convincing case that it
occurred for reasons related to ideals of democratic governance. For example, a homesteader
could gain title to federal land only from the federal government. This gave federal employees
charged with issuing land titles a monopoly in
granting them. In general, the homesteader and
the federal employee entered into what Parrillo

calls a “customer-seller” relationship, in which
the parties negotiated a fee to facilitate the
exchange. The negotiated payment was criticized at the time as closer to monopoly pricegouging on the part of the federal employee
than to a fair bargain. Facilitative payments
were also attacked as an effort by the executive
to impinge on legislative (that is, democratic)
authority to fund the government. Finally, what
was in effect the sale of government privileges,
such as homesteaded land or federal citizenship, violated the ideal of disinterested service
by government employees, turning them into
hustlers rather than gentlemen.
Parrillo notes that these arguments originated with the opposition to the early Stuarts
in 17th-century England, but, given the incentives (such as money for land title or for citizenship), the perceived corruption of facilitative payments continued until the late 19th
and early 20th centuries in most states, when
the second transformative stage took place.
This stage, in which facilitative payments were
finally replaced by salaries, occurred only when
government viewed the services provided by
its agents as a limited good.
Parrillo offers an example. At the time
when, in exchange for a facilitative payment,
government agents granted title to homesteaded land, they did so quite liberally. From the
late 19th century through the early 20th century, this approach was criticized as what we
might call a zero-sum game, in that land granted to one cannot be granted to another. This
view of land as a limited resource led to the
end of the customer-seller transaction model
predominant in the facilitative payments era.
This model, Parrillo argues, was replaced by
an interest-group politics model, in which the
desires of one group were compared with the
interests of another, and adjusted by Congress
to make it less claimant-friendly. One way to
achieve a less claimant-friendly administrative
process was to replace facilitative payments
with salaries.
Salaries replaced bounties for a different reason: Resistance to some government
actions, such as its efforts to collect taxes
and customs duties, made a bounty a less
effective tool in accomplishing these actions.
Bounties, in Parrillo’s telling, overemphasized
coercion and underestimated the need, in a
democratic society, for public cooperation.
When the government gave a bounty hunter a
strong economic incentive to enforce the letter
of the law, it made those against whom the law
was applied suspicious and distrustful of the
government. Power tends to corrupt, and the

delegation of governmental power to those
with an incentive to earn more by finding more
and more persons in violation of the law led
bounty hunters to apply the law mercilessly
and, in some cases, fraudulently.
When the federal or state governments
used bounties as incentives, they often failed to
account for the possibility that those incentives
might generate harmful consequences, including greater corruption. Against the Profit
Motive demonstrates, in the disparate areas of
criminal law enforcement, tax collection, and
naval warfare, the difficulty that governments
had in creating effective incentives that did not
give rise to corruption.
That difficulty was a signal reason for the
move from bounties to salaries. This shift is
particularly interesting in light of the recent
scandal at the Department of Veterans Affairs,
in which some VA employees were paid bonuses for reaching performance metrics even as
some veterans failed to receive timely care, and
in the cases in several states in which public
school teachers and administrators falsified
records related to student performance on
standardized tests to receive bonuses or to
retain their jobs.
Though some of its material is daunting,
Against the Profit Motive makes for rewarding reading. 
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